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THE CITADEL AND THE HOME PLACE UNDER SIEGE
Robert Mason
Julian E. Zelizer. On Capitol Hill: The Struggle to Reform Congress and Its
Consequences, 1948–2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pho-
tographs, notes, and index. xvi + 359 pp. $30.00.
Citadel, published in 1957, was a best-selling exploration of the contemporary
U.S. Senate. Journalist William S. White sought to provide his readers with
insights into the workings of the institution, a strikingly hierarchical, isolated,
and secretive body. This was not an attack but a celebration of the Senate’s
club-like atmosphere, which White praised for its encouragement of biparti-
san cooperation. Southern Democrats, whose seniority earned them special
influence through control of committees, won notable praise in White’s
account for their promotion of stability and compromise.1 But what White
perceived as the Senate’s strengths were antidemocratic weaknesses in the
eyes of some politicians and activists who were then coalescing in pursuit of
congressional reform. Julian Zelizer’s On Capitol Hill is a very successful
analysis of this coalition’s origins, its long quest for reform that reshaped the
House of Representatives as well as the Senate, and the unanticipated
consequences of its legislative and procedural achievements. By the end of the
twentieth century, the House and the Senate constituted a more open and less
hierarchical legislature, but the partisan conflict that increasingly character-
ized Congress fueled new frustrations, including deeper public dissatisfac-
tion with the political process.
This was an elite-led impetus to deepen Congress’s democratic responsive-
ness, one that changed the institution dramatically without necessarily
strengthening its connections with the people. On Capitol Hill underscores the
obstacles to political reform and in particular the strength of an institution’s
resistance to disruptive change. “In the most basic of terms,” Zelizer writes,
“this book posits that reforming government is much harder work than most
politicians or pundits admit” (p. 3). With its analysis of a successful effort to
transform the procedures and structures of Congress, the book compellingly
describes the subtle complexities involved in achieving this change and the
paradoxical nature of its consequences.
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The Congress described by White was at the height of what Zelizer terms
the committee era, characterized not only by strong committees and influen-
tial chairs whom seniority elevated to positions of leadership. Cozy relation-
ships existed between the committees and the handful of relevant interest
groups and between politicians and respectfully deferential journalists. Fur-
ther characterizing the era were “secrecy in deliberations, a particular type of
campaign process, the structure of districts, . . . [and] norms and rules that
guided behavior among legislators” (p. 4). The nature of Congress changed
fundamentally when the procedures and regulations that underpinned this
committee era underwent wholesale reform, a process that was concentrated
during the 1970s. These reforms attacked the role of committee chairs,
weakened the importance of seniority, encouraged the development of
subcommittees, reduced the power of filibusters, strengthened restrictions on
campaign finance, created ethics codes, instituted an independent budget-
development body, and boosted the significance of party caucuses.
The creation of a fragile coalition in support of reform is a central concern
of the book. Race informed the initial quest for reform. A group of Democrats
elected to Congress in the late 1940s found that the committee system
threatened the achievement of an urban liberal agenda, even though, as
Zelizer notes, during the New Deal this process had “facilitated a significant
expansion of the state, with southern Democrats at the helm” (p. 24). Among
a wide-ranging set of policy concerns, civil rights was especially significant in
encouraging the coalition’s coherence and its commitment to reform. This
coalition enjoyed a notable and significant triumph in gradually defining the
committee system as problematic despite its political strength and despite the
general public’s indifference to the reform cause.
Significant allies of reform included scholars whose work on Congress
concluded that its structures posed an obstacle to effective government.
Reform was necessary, they argued, for Congress to fulfill a positive role in
policy-making during an era dominated by a powerful and dynamic presi-
dency. These scholars shared the optimism in reform of its political advocates.
“The assumption was that if institutions were fixed, liberalism would flourish
and Congress would be revitalized: current institutional design discouraged
policy innovation, shielded leadership, and weakened Congress,” Zelizer
writes (p. 87). Though the precise nature of their contribution to the reform
impetus is clearly difficult to define, this study stresses the positive role of
academic research and testimony. During the 1960s, their work “constituted
another important realignment of the institutional environment surrounding
Congress . . . that favored institutional change” (p. 91). The same period saw
the reform coalition become a wider-ranging liberal coalition that included an
array of interest groups—Common Cause, founded in 1970, notable among
them—as well as a new generation of Democratic politicians; the target of
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these reformers’ concerns extended far beyond the entrenched influence of
southern Democrats and embraced a much broader critique of the U.S.
political system. Tensions between the Nixon administration and Congress,
especially severe over the budget process and war powers, raised the stakes
for liberals, for whom this conflict offered fresh evidence of the need for a
more assertive and effective counterbalance to the executive. Significantly,
when the coalition in favor of reform broadened and the key concerns of its
members became more diverse, its main goals did not change. Zelizer
emphasizes the importance of this unity of purpose, promoted by the initial
success of reform advocates in defining congressional structures as the
obstacle to better policy, in explaining their cause’s achievements.
Apathy usually characterized the public view of congressional reform. The
process described by Zelizer involved an elite-led movement that experi-
enced success in pursuing its goals when it managed to win wider support
within the ranks of the political elite. Nevertheless, the ideals of participatory
democracy, together with the conviction that the structures of the committee
era did not serve those ideals well, informed this elite’s initiatives. Moreover,
concerns about the potential disfavor among voters for politicians who
avoided the cause of reform were significant on a number of occasions.
During the 1950s reform advocates promoted their issue by arguing that the
Democratic party might lose its majority status unless it lost its association
with the congressional power of southern conservatives. Investigations of
Congress by journalists, scholars, and reform politicians during the 1960s
then elevated the issue’s salience, because they “helped create a perception
among politicians that there was a burgeoning interest in reform. This was
important since legislators were concerned with determining the potential
preferences of voters” (p. 77). When in 1970 the House Rules Committee
initiated an investigation of seniority, this difficult breakthrough arrived
partly because Democrats sought to thwart Republican efforts to steal reform
as a political issue. Only in 1974, following Watergate and a scandal involving
the personal behavior of House Ways and Means chair Wilbur Mills, was
reform significant in electoral terms.
But the coalition enjoyed success even before the appearance of any
electoral mandate. Legislation passed in 1972 reformed campaign finance
through disclosure requirements and cost limitations; significantly, disagree-
ments within the coalition and particularly the opposition of organized labor
prevented the regulation of Political Action Committees. Another weakness
of the legislation involved the absence of enforcement mechanisms, and the
coalition provided evidence of its multifaceted strength when reform-minded
interest groups, led by Common Cause, promoted its implementation through
a campaign of publicity, monitoring, and litigation. Watergate, “a turning
point in the politics of institutional reform,” then revitalized the reform
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impetus by making Republicans fearful of voters’ retribution for the Nixon
administration’s crimes, while the self-interest of Democrats continued to
encourage them to look for ways in which to close the financial gap between
the parties’ funding (p. 118). Legislation passed in 1974 did not create public
financing for congressional campaigns, as reformers desired, but it did so for
presidential races and it imposed contribution and spending limits, as well as
establishing the Federal Election Commission (FEC).
The issue’s forceful, though temporary, arrival as an issue important to
voters ensured that politicians tackled many of the procedural problems
identified by the reform coalition. As in the case of campaign finance reform,
progress preceded as well as followed the Watergate scandal. A variety of
reforms accepted by Congress between 1970 and 1974 undermined the power
of committee chairs to ensure that these influential politicians remained
responsive to the concerns of rank-and-file members. The success revealed
the wisdom of short-term legislative tactics as well as the strength of the long-
term campaign. The coalition ran publicity campaigns in support of their
goals; reform leaders selected proposals that would maintain the coherence of
the coalition and win bipartisan support. After the “Watergate babies” won
election to Congress in the 1974 midterms, they helped to secure measures
that finally fulfilled the reformers’ initial vision: the Democratic party caucus
in the House replaced three senior committee chairs and the Senate modified
the filibuster.
When scandal provided an opportunity for reform, the coalition eagerly
and successfully grasped its opportunities. The crimes of Watergate facilitated
the passage of legislation reforming the financing of political campaigns. In
the aftermath of Richard Nixon’s resignation from the presidency, the
“Watergate babies” then boosted the numbers of liberal reform advocates in
Congress who successfully demanded institutional reform. Excellent in re-
counting the political implications of scandals and in persuasively developing
the case for their larger historical significance, Zelizer underscores the
importance of a number of scandals contributing to “the complex mixture of
randomness and preexisting structure that produced institutional change in
the 1970s” (p. 157). But scandal lost its power to encourage institutional
change. A characteristic of the new Congress taking shape in the late 1970s
was not any absence of scandal; indeed, the aggression of journalism helped
to ensure that more cases of political abuses received exposure. Responses
focused on individual transgressions rather than institutional shortcomings,
however, and thus did not initiate meaningful calls for reform. The changing
consequences of scandal help to explain the reform impulse’s decline. So do
changing priorities of Democrats who had promoted reform; they were
comfortable with the institutional setting their reforms had fostered, while the
nation’s economic problems absorbed their attention instead of institutional
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issues. They also discovered that it was often yet more difficult to secure the
passage of legislation in the new Congress than the old. Meanwhile, the larger
reform coalition fell prey to disagreements that undermined its effectiveness;
it now lacked the necessary unity of purpose.
The coalition’s vitality during the long quest for reform leads Zelizer to
conclude that historians have often incorrectly assumed the decline or
disappearance of the good-government, mugwump tradition during the
twentieth century. Instead this tradition remained “alive and well,” if modi-
fied to embrace the need for more direct political involvement in search of
reform (p. 5). The nature of the reform agenda and of liberalism during the
1970s has received some thoughtful attention from scholars, and this study
further helps to explain the paradox of how a desire to revitalize democratic
processes involved solutions that led to renewed public disaffection with
politics.2 It also tackles another paradox of political change: the reformers
sought to strengthen the political parties in Congress, yet they achieved this
goal at the same time as parties continued to suffer a long decline as an
electoral force. The book engages, moreover, with the irony of the early belief
that reform would lead to programmatic liberal achievements. “The coalition
believed,” Zelizer notes, “that institutions were propping up a small group of
conservative politicians who did not reflect the wishes of a liberal nation” (p.
6). Instead, liberals discovered that “the decline of the committee era had not
meant a resurgence of progressive policies” (p. 262).
Congressional reform took place within a larger transformation of political
institutions and structures, including the growth of interest groups and think
tanks, an increasingly adversarial relationship between politicians and jour-
nalists, and the involvement of federal judges in adjudicating issues of
legislative apportionment, as well as their growing role in the process of
policy interpretation and implementation. Zelizer skillfully investigates the
implications for Congress of change within other institutions, creating power-
ful support for the sometimes underappreciated significance of the wider
context in which pieces of political history should be understood. Journalism
receives special attention in Zelizer’s account of change in Congress. The
growing cynicism toward government of the fourth estate, associated with
the Vietnam war as well as the Watergate scandal, exposed legislators to
scrutiny far less deferential than that practiced by journalists of White’s
generation. The change of tone within press coverage of Congress in itself
signaled a political transformation, while journalists’ willingness, and even
eagerness, to expose politicians’ shortcomings provided the necessary ammu-
nition with which the reform coalition could attack the institution’s problems.
The development of cable television facilitated the launch in 1979 of C-SPAN,
providing full coverage first of the House and later also of the Senate,
increasing the openness of their deliberations. The advent of congressional
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television represented a reform that leaders had resisted, but its appearance
provided opportunities, welcome to many in Congress, to speak directly to
voters, free from the skeptical mediation of journalists. Both party leaders and
political mavericks were able to do so, a development “that complemented
the tendency of the new legislative environment to foster competing centers
of power” (p. 207). Together, new journalistic practices and the availability of
C-SPAN created a new climate for congressional politics.
The courts facilitated the transformation of Congress in similarly subtle yet
significant ways. Supreme Court decisions on legislative apportionment, the
result of liberal lawsuits, threatened the electoral security of conservatives in
the rural South. During the 1960s, this threat gave hope to the liberal coalition;
beyond the 1960s, the hope was gradually realized with the decline of this
Democratic faction that had thrived during the committee era. But the
Supreme Court also frustrated the reformers when its Buckley vs. Valeo
decision of 1976 banned non-voluntary spending limits in campaigns and
restricted the powers of the FEC.
The consequences of congressional reform were very different from those
anticipated by its advocates. Reformers sought strong parties that were
accountable to rank-and-file members, but the simultaneously centralizing
and decentralizing structures and procedures that these concerns promoted
did not seem to create the dynamic and responsive body they favored. “The
schizophrenic character of the modern legislative process” provided opportu-
nities both for strong initiatives of party leadership and for rank-and-file
challenges to the leadership (p. 256). The career of Newt Gingrich forms the
centerpiece of Zelizer’s analysis of the transformed Congress. Gingrich
exploited the new congressional structures and processes in promoting his
conservative brand of Republican politics. With like-minded Republicans in
the Conservative Opportunity Society, he made enterprising use of television,
especially C-SPAN, starting in the early 1980s. He deployed the tools by
which party leaders were now more responsive to rank-and-file members of
Congress to promote conservatism and partisanship. Gingrich, moreover,
attacked congressional Democrats for ethics violations not in pursuit of
procedural reforms but as a means to bring voters’ attention to their short-
comings in government, as well as to attack individual Democrats in power.
But when the Republican party finally overturned Democratic majorities in
1994, Gingrich found that the pursuit of his “Contract with America” through
strong party leadership in the House achieved partisan conflict with the
Clinton administration but relatively few of his goals. It was not long before
Gingrich himself lost his speakership amid accusations of ethics violations.
In investigating the extensive transformation of the political process since
the 1960s, Zelizer tackles developments that relatively few historians have
addressed.3 Congress has particularly suffered in this regard. By contrast, a
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wide-ranging literature within political science analyzes the rise of “the new
American state” and its consequences for the formation of public policy. On
Capitol Hill tackles a key aspect of this transformation, and its historical
approach not only provides an account of the longer-term forces that shaped
the reform impetus, but in doing so it also fashions insights different from
those offered by political scientists who have studied the topic and whose
work has often concentrated on legislators’ individual behavior.4 These
insights often emerge from Zelizer’s impressively extensive explorations of
manuscript collections. Notable among recent contributions in political sci-
ence is Eric Schickler’s wide-ranging study of the “disjointed pluralism” that
underpinned congressional reform since the late nineteenth century.5 Like
Schickler, Zelizer explores the competing motivations that encouraged mem-
bers of Congress to support reform, finding, for example, that electoral
concerns rarely were important among them. The scrutiny of archival detail
about reformers in his account then elevates certain factors, such as race and
scandal, as especially salient in understanding the complex dynamics of the
reform impetus. Like Schickler, Zelizer develops a sophisticated picture of
institutional change over time. Zelizer has written elsewhere of the benefits of
interaction between historians and political scientists, especially those within
the “American Political Development” school, in revitalizing political his-
tory.6 In this book he provides compelling support for his case.
William White acknowledged in his memoirs that according to Citadel’s
detractors “its enormous respect and affection for Tradition were fusty,” but
continued to defend his praise for the committee era, a time of careful
deliberation and respectful debate. “Nowhere else, as it seemed to me, could
I have met and known so diverse a group of men of a likably flawed brilliance
in one direction or another,” he wrote, viewing with alarm the harshly
partisan, scandal-ridden Congress of the 1980s.7 Zelizer persuasively depicts
the problems of the era that inspired reform and the shortcomings of the
system that reform produced. The process of change itself receives masterly
treatment, both sensitive to the contributions to the process of individual
political actors and perceptive about the larger institutional frameworks in
which the process took place.
Robert Mason, lecturer in history, University of Edinburgh, is the author of
Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New Majority (2004).
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